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1 More speciﬁcally, this ﬁgure is 19.2% in Belgium, 1
Austria. In Spain this number is slightly higher (23.5
smaller. In these four countries the average rate is 18.
instance, since Belgium has three regions. See Brune
mobility ﬁgures.a b s t r a c t
In the North of Europe, club membership is higher than in the South, but the frequency of contacts with
friends, relatives and neighbors is lower. We link this fact to another one: the low geographical mobility
rates in the South of Europe relative to the North.
To interpret these facts, we build a model of local social capital and mobility. Investing in local ties is
rational when workers do not expect to move to another region. We ﬁnd that observationally close indi-
viduals may take different paths characterized by high local social capital, low mobility and high unem-
ployment, vs. low social capital, high propensity to move and higher employment probability.
Employment protection reinforces the accumulation of local social capital and thus reduces mobility.
European data supports the theory: within a country and at the individual level, more social capital is
associated with lower mobility.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
‘‘[. . . ] it appears evidently from experience that a man is of all
sorts of luggage the most difﬁcult to be transported.”
Adam Smith, ‘‘Wealth of Nations”
In Europe the fraction of the 0–99 years old population having
moved to their current residence within a year is small (around
5%), according to estimates from the European Community House-
hold Panel (ECHP hereafter). This value varies across European
countries, with residential mobility being lowest in Southern Euro-
pean countries (2.8% in Spain, 2.7% in Portugal, 2.1% in Italy, 1.9% in
Greece) and in countries such as Ireland and Austria (1.9 and 2.3,
respectively) and is highest in Scandinavian countries (7% in Swe-
den, 9% in Finland, 6.6% in Denmark) and in Germany (6.8%). In
contrast, according to the US Census population, the US residential
mobility rate in 2000 was 15.5%. Regional mobility is also low in
Europe, compared to the US where about 30% of individuals were
born in a different state. By contrast, in Europe this proportion is
only 20% for individuals born in a different region within the same
country (at least in regions similar in size to the US states).1ll rights reserved.
. Wasmer).
2.7% in Portugal and 16.8% in
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llo et al. (2007) for regionalWe link these facts to another set of facts: countries differ quite
widely as regards to social capital investments, and more precisely,
in the type of social capital accumulated. In the ECHP, individuals are
asked about: (i) the frequency of relationships with neighbors, (ii)
the frequency of contacts with friends and relatives outside the
household, and (iii) club membership. Transforming the answers
to theﬁrst twoquestions into adaily frequency2 to simplify the expo-
sition,we report countryaverages inTable1.With respect to the above
questions, one can observe a striking North–South divide: in the South
of Europe (and in Ireland too), there is a higher frequency of contacts
with friends, relatives and neighbors, and lower membership rates
in clubs and associations. The opposite holds in the North of Europe.
We interpret this as a difference in the nature of social capital.
Strong family and friendship ties reﬂect a relatively more local so-
cial capital, thusmaking mobility more costly. Local social capital re-
ﬂects the ties that individuals have to their region/area of origin,
and is therefore partly or fully depreciated upon mobility. In con-
trast, being a member of a club (such as a Scrabble or a chess lea-
gue) can be considered as less local and more general kind of social
capital: club members can build new ties in another club in a new
city, and this may even help them cope with mobility.
We argue in this paper that the concept of local social capital
provides a convenient and parsimonious explanation to cross-
country variations in geographical mobility rates in Europe, and
in particular why it is lower in the South and higher in the North
of Europe. Further, we illustrate how various types of social capital2 Details on the procedure and questions are given in Section 5.
Table 1
Aggregate social capital.
Country Friendfreq Neibfreq Club
Nordic countries and the UK
Denmark 0.43 0.418 0.621
Finland 0.459 0.523 0.525
Sweden 0.436 na 0.694
UK 0.576 0.280 0.627
Western Europe
Austria 0.358 0.463 0.495
Belgium 0.410 0.390 0.394
Germany 0.147 na 0.328
Ireland 0.789 0.620 0.487
Luxembourg 0.448 0.473 0.410
Netherlands 0.420 0.367 0.480
Southern Europe
Greece 0.695 0.808 0.121
Italy 0.576 0.547 0.238
Portugal 0.478 0.666 0.215
Spain 0.740 0.681 0.285
Correlation with
Friendfreq 1 0.61 0.22
Neibfreq 0.61 1 0.79
Club 0.22 0.79 1
Notes: The table displays the average value of the social capital measures by country
for the active population. Dimension: daily frequency of contacts with friends and
relatives (friendfreq), with neighbors (neibfreq), or average club membershib
(club). Sample period is 1994–2001, except Finland (1996–2001), Sweden (1997–
2001), Austria (1995–2001) and Luxembourg (1994). ‘‘na” refers to non-available
data. See Section 5 for more details on the methodology used to construct these
indexes.
3 Glaeser et al. (2002) notably argue that ‘‘social capital declines with expected
mobility” and conﬁrm this prediction with an expected probability score based on
demographics.
4 Our deﬁnition of social capital obviously belongs to the second set of deﬁnitions
proposed by Durlauf and Fafchamps. Indeed, we deﬁne the social capital according to
its local characteristics.
5 See Coleman (1990, p. 321).
6 See also Schiff (2002) for a similar argument in a trade context and sound
conclusions regarding both trade and immigration policies.
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reciprocal is also true, since the anticipation of mobility affects so-
cial capital investments, as mentioned in Glaeser et al. (2002). If
individuals perceive themselves as being strongly attached to a vil-
lage, a township or a region, they will invest in local social capital,
because the returns from these local ties are high.
Understanding the determinants of geographical mobility
matters as it reﬂects economies’ ability to cope with change
and to reallocate production factors to where they will be more
efﬁcient, and ultimately to raise the aggregate employment rate.
In particular, an inﬂuential work by Bertola and Ichino (1995)
documented the inability of European workers to move to more
dynamic regions. According to these authors, this occurs because
of wage and income compression, thus lowering the returns
from mobility. Low mobility and wage compressing labor market
institutions have indeed been central in many explanations of
unemployment in Europe (see Layard et al., 1991; Layard and
Nickell, 1999), since residential mobility widely differs across
countries. In this paper we enrich these theories using the con-
cept of local social capital.
In Section 2, we ﬁrst review the literature on social capital and
emphasize its implicit or explicit geographical dimensions. In Sec-
tion3wedevelopa simplepartial equilibrium job searchmodelwith
geographicalmobility decisions, given the level of social capital.We
show that more social capital always reduces mobility with ambig-
uous effects on unemployment: social capital increases unemploy-
ment only if it depreciates more after geographical mobility than
after job loss. In Section4,weexplore the determinants of social cap-
ital. We ﬁnd that ex ante observationally close individuals may be-
have very differently: some will not invest a great deal in local
social capital and will thus be more mobile and better employed,
whileotherswill investmore in local social capital, remain immobile
and unemployed, but enjoy the returns to their social capital.
In Section 5, we match theory and the data by providing a panel
analysis based on the ECHP. Using probit, IV and ﬁxed effects, weestablish a few stable relations within the data, notably: (1) Indi-
viduals endowed with more local social capital as described by
the variables ‘‘Friends/relatives”, ‘‘Neighbors” or ‘‘Club” are less
likely to move to another region. (2) Individuals endowed with
more local social capital such as that described by the variables
‘‘Friends” or ‘‘Neighbors” are more likely to become unemployed.
(3) By contrast, individuals who are members of a club are less
likely to become unemployed. (4) In all three dimensions mea-
sured, workers in a region not that of their birth have less social
capital (‘‘Friends/relatives”, ‘‘Neighbors” and ‘‘Club”).
In the conclusion, we further explore the explanatory power of
social capital on aggregate unemployment, and conclude that more
work on this issue is needed, given the concept’s potential. Finally
we argue that, as a result of these two self-reinforcing causalities
and this externality, local social capital is a binding factor: even
in the presence of strong economic incentives to migrate, such as
regional unemployment differentials, individuals may prefer to
live on welfare and enjoy local social capital.2. Local social capital: selected literature review
There are many deﬁnitions of social capital. In this section, we
attempt to deﬁne the concept in relation to our own purpose: to
link social capital with geographical mobility and employment
decisions. Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005) distinguish between
two different deﬁnitions of social capital: (1) ‘‘outcome-oriented”
deﬁnitions and particularly the importance of group externalities
caused by the existence of social capital; (2) deﬁnitions focusing
on the nature of relations and the interdependence of individuals
embodied in social capital, such as ‘‘shared trust, norms and val-
ues”. The former results more from the existence of social capital,
and the latter its nature. Here, along the lines of Glaeser et al.
(2002),3 we deal with the consequences of social capital, focusing
on the localness of social capital and its depreciation.4
The depreciation of social capital is not a new idea: Coleman
(1990) in particular clearly expressed the idea that social capital
can depreciate if there is no investment to renew it. ‘‘Social rela-
tionships die out if not maintained; expectations and obligations with-
er over time; and norms depend on regular communication”.5
Although there is no explicit spatial dimension here, a simple
cost–beneﬁt analysis suggests that being further away (geographi-
cally) increases the maintenance cost of social capital and is associ-
ated with lower stock in equilibrium.
The localness is also implicit in many works. Even before the
term ‘‘social capital” was introduced, studies such as that of Jacobs’
(1961) on large American cities, underlined the importance of im-
plicit rules in neighborhoods: a knowledge of those implicit rules
allows for the building of trust. She showed that social ties are
especially stronger in older neighborhoods. This work is one of
the earliest in which the geographical dimension of social capital
is stressed: social ties as deﬁned here cannot be moved from one
place to another. Schiff (1992) argued that higher mobility could
be detrimental to welfare, due to an excessive depletion of social
capital.6
It is also worth noting however that social capital is not exclu-
sively local, and instead can be built in order to promote mobility.
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beginning of the 20th century in the US. They were originally de-
signed to reproduce the social environment of professionals en-
joyed when moved from one place to the other, and were
precisely intended to provide a substitute to local social capital.7
Another example comes from the literature on development: Win-
ters et al. (2001) analyze the effect networks have on the choice to
migrate from Mexico to the United States, ﬁnding that there could
be a positive link between social capital and migration, especially
since networks provide information on where to move.
The labor literature emphasizes the following mechanism: so-
cial capital conveys information and leads to an improvement in
the quality of matches made between employers and employees.
For instance, Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) propose a theo-
retical framework in which they assume that the probability of
ﬁnding a new job depends on the social network of the agent.8
It is interesting to note that most works surveyed emphasize
the positive role of social capital on labor market performance,
while in this paper we tend to emphasize certain negative chan-
nels. Bentolila et al. (2010) provides a counterexample, and looks
more speciﬁcally at European countries, emphasizing the potential
negative links between social capital and labor markets. In partic-
ular, they argue that jobs obtained through social networks have a
wage discount, distorting choices towards inefﬁciency. See also Da-
vid et al. (2008a) for a more complete literature review.
In an insightful empirical paper based on PSID data in the US,
Kan (2007) uses the concept of local capital and applies some of
the same intuition we formalize in our model. Our paper is more
devoted to labor markets and unemployment than Kan’s paper,
and our paper is focussed on cross-country differences in social
capital while they focus on the US. Another recent paper by Belot
and Ermisch (2006) addresses an issue very similar to ours. While
they too do not have any formal theory contrary to us, they do have
very good data on social capital (although for a single country, the
UK), and this in particular allows them to explore two aspects of
the strength of social ties: location of the closest friends and fre-
quency of contacts. Their results actually emphasize the impor-
tance of the ﬁrst factor.9 These conclusions are also reached in a
recent paper by Dahl and Sorenson (2010). In their paper, the
authors ﬁnd that skilled workers such as engineers and technical
workers have very strong preferences for living close to family and
friends. In a somewhat different context, Spilimbergo and Ubeda
(2004a,b) argue that US Black workers are less mobile than Whites
due to family ties (2004b) and successfully test this using the PSID
survey. Finally, a recent and subsequent paper by Alesina et al.
(2009) emphasizes the role of family values on geographical mobil-
ity. The two papers are similar and distinct. Our work is both more
general since it involves both family values and friendship ties as a
determinant of mobility and does not focus on family values only.
In turn, Alesina et al. (2009) have an interesting set of instruments
based on the origin of migrants in the US and show that US residents7 We would like to thank Robert Putnam for this relevant example. The statement
on the Rotary Club web page reads ‘‘The world’s ﬁrst service club, the Rotary Club of
Chicago, Illinois, USA, was formed on 23 February, 1905 by Paul P. Harris, an attorney
who wished to recapture in a professional club the same friendly spirit he had felt in
the small towns of his youth. The name ‘‘Rotary” derived from the early practice of
rotating meetings among members’ ofﬁces.”
8 See also Granovetter (1995) on how social capital improves welfare through the
creation of an efﬁcient network comprising social ties that allows for better
expectations; Ioannides and Loury (2004) on how networks affect labor-market
outcomes and inequality; Montgomery (1991) on the importance of referrals to
outcomes on the labor market.
9 The dataset used by Belot and Ermisch (2006) allows them to explore other
instruments to describe the environment in which the individual spent his/her
childhood. They consider the number of biological siblings in the household when the
individual was 14 years old, his birth-order, the level of education of his parents and
whether s/he grew up in a rural or urban area.originating from a country with strong family values still move less a
century after their family migrated. They also endogenize labor mar-
ket institutions and family values, where in this paper we treat as
exogenous labor market institutions and endogenize the equivalent
of their family values (family ties) and more generally all types of so-
cial capital.
3. Model
In this model, we describe the maximization program for an
individual who invests in social capital, assuming in particular
that an individual’s stock of social capital directly increases util-
ity, with no social externality. There are several channels
through which more social capital increases ex-ante utility, such
as insurance, information ﬂows or the complementarity with lei-
sure. Developing a model along these dimensions is beyond the
scope of our theory, given that we are already focusing on other
dimensions, such as localness of social capital and mobility
decisions.
3.1. Setup
We consider a typical worker living over two periods. There are
two Regions A and B. Without any loss of generality, we assume
the worker is born in Region A, and lives and works there in period
1. We assume she is endowed with S units of social capital. If she
leaves Region A, then her social capital is depreciated and she only
retains a fraction of it. This is the localness property of social cap-
ital. Let us use dk to denote the depreciation rate, which describes
the degree of localness of social capital. We may consider, for in-
stance, that by leaving her native region, she loses dk friends, or
meets with her relative less frequently.10
We also consider that social capital is to some extent profes-
sional: this is a second dimension of social capital that will be of
some use in our analysis. This dimension does in fact have a
ﬁrst-order impact on job acceptance decisions, in the sense that
when one loses a job, a few social connections are lost as well.
To symmetrically process the localness and the ‘‘professionalness”
of social capital, we use dp to denote the depreciation rate of social
capital when the agent is unemployed in the second period.11
Hence, the set of parameters (dk,dp) allows us to describe vari-
ous types of social capital, with values assigned as follows. For in-
stance, social capital associated with being a member of an
association that is both local and professional (e.g., the association
of textile engineers in a given region, such as the North of France)
would imply that dk = 1 and dp = 1; social capital of being in a local
sport club (e.g., a local soccer club) or having friends in the same
neighborhood would imply that dk = 1 and dp = 0; social capital of
being a member of a country-wide association (e.g., Scrabble,
chess) would imply that dk = 0 and dp = 0; and ﬁnally social capital
of member of a country-wide professional association (such as the10 Through focusing on a deﬁnition similar to ours, Glaeser et al. (2002) show that
the amount of an individual’s social capital negatively depends on the probability of
leaving her community. Data from the General Social Survey support this conclusion.
More particularly, they build an expected mobility measure and ﬁnd a strong negative
correlation with social capital measures. Home ownership is instead positively
correlated with social capital. Other papers follow a similar framework, such as Belot
and Ermisch (2006), Bräuninger (2002), Kan (2007) and Spilimbergo and Ubeda
(2004a,b).
11 Our two concepts of social capital are linked with weak and strong ties sometimes
mentioned in the literature on labor markets and social networks. According to Calvó-
Armengol et al. (2007) for example, strong ties are those connecting ‘‘members of the
same family or very close friends” and weak ties as ‘‘a transitory social encounter
between two persons”. Although it may not be immediately clear why we introduce
these two social capital dimensions, it will become evident that this is a necessary
distinction when rationalizing the empirical results, especially in terms of the effect
that social capital has on unemployment probability.
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dp = 1.12
We assume that social capital increases utility linearly. Let X2
be the income of the individual in the second period, and to sim-
plify, we assume that utility in second period U2 is
U2 ¼
X2 þ S if the worker is employed in Region A
X2 þ ð1 dpÞS if the worker is non-employed in Region A
X2 þ ð1 dkÞS if the worker is employed in Region B
X2 þ ð1 dkÞð1 dpÞS if the worker is non-employed in Region B
8>>><
>>:
:
ð1Þ
The labor market is a standard partial equilibrium search set-
up. If workers are unemployed, we assume they receive an income
X2 = b interpreted as unemployment beneﬁts or leisure indepen-
dent of social capital. If employed, their income is their wage w.
To simplify the description, jobs last one period, though this
assumption is relaxed in Section 4.2.2, where we investigate the
role of more stable employment relationships and of employment
protection. The wage is random: in the beginning of the second
period, workers receive one job offer with a wage w from a cumu-
lated distribution F in Region A and one job offer with a wage w*
from a cumulated distribution G in Region B (f and g are the asso-
ciated densities). The random draws are uncorrelated, and we use
w to denote the upper support of those distributions. For both dis-
tributions, we also assume that the lower bound of the support is 0.
As an illustration, in a world where all regions are symmetric
and have the same labor market conditions, it might be considered
that G > F (ﬁrst order stochastic dominance) would reﬂect the fact
that workers have more local contacts and thus receive better local
offers. It might be interesting to rationalize, for instance, that
workers receive multiple independent offers of quantity n and p
with n > p, from a common distribution F0. In this case, we can pre-
cisely show that the expected value of the wage is for instanceR w
0 wdðFn0ðwÞÞ or alternatively that F ¼ Fn0 and G ¼ Fp0.13 In a world
where certain regions are depressed and others are booming, for
the main part of the support, we would however assume F > G. For
our results, we see no need to order the distributions at all.3.2. Workers’ program
In a second period, all individuals have to prospect for a job.
There are four possible choices, as described in Eq. (1): staying in
the home region and remaining unemployed; moving and remain-
ing unemployed; staying and accepting the local wage offer; mov-
ing and accepting the foreign job offer. We can discard the second
possibility, given that U2 = b + (1  dk)(1  dp)S (unemployed in B)
is always lower than b + (1  dp)S (unemployed in A). The decision
set can thus be summarized as
U2ðSÞ ¼ max bþ ð1 dpÞS;wþ S;w þ ð1 dkÞSf g; ð2Þ
where the max operator reﬂects the optimal mobility/job accep-
tance decisions, which are the joint decisions explored in the next
section. Offers from inside and outside the region occur simulta-
neously, as do decisions by the individual to move or to stay and
to accept a job or remain unemployed (see Appendix A). In particu-
lar for the individual’s decision tree: the worker compares her (best)
local offer w, her best foreign offer w* and her outside option b, as
indicated in Eq. (2).12 Here, social capital is deﬁned by a particular geographical depreciation and
particular professional depreciation considered as parameters. In Section 4.2.1, we
relax this assumption and investigate the case where an agent can invest in two types
of social capital, one local and the other professional and show that the assumptions
of the benchmark case have no consequence.
13 Chapter 6 in Ljunqvist and Sargent (2004).At this stage, we introduce two useful notations that will show
up subsequently in many equations:
wr ¼ b dpS: ð3Þ
wr ¼ bþ ðdk  dpÞS: ð4Þ
The quantity wr may be interpreted as the reservation wage for an
offer in Region A: it is the local wage that makes the agent indiffer-
ent to accepting or rejecting the job offer. It increases in b and de-
creases in social capital: a higher S increases the acceptance rate
in Region A. This brings about the possibility of a positive impact
of S on employment: the worker has more to lose in rejecting a
job offer if this would decrease its utility through the loss of social
capital dpS. Similarly,wr* is interpreted as a reservation wage for Re-
gion B offers: the worker balances out staying unemployed and
enjoying b, but sacriﬁcing dpS units of social capital, or moving
and obtaining a job in B but sacriﬁcing dkS units of social capital.14
The interesting conﬂict arising from the impact that S has on job
acceptance and on mobility can be signed out if we introduce a def-
inition of local social capital.
Deﬁnition. Social capital is said to be relatively local if dk > dp, that
is, if more is lost from a regional move than from a job loss. It is
said to be relatively professional if instead dp > dk, while it is said to
be neutral if there is equality between the two parameters.
When social capital is relatively local, more social capital raises
w*r because moving to secure a job in Region B generates more so-
cial capital losses than it saves in professional social capital. Social
capital in this case reduces the acceptance rate of offers and conse-
quently geographical mobility. Here we obtain a mechanism that
may have either a positive or a negative impact of S on unemploy-
ment, depending on the localness of social capital.
The fact that relative depreciation rates have an effect on the
sign attached to the impact of social capital on unemployment jus-
tiﬁes our decision to consider both social capital dimensions, since
it helps rationalize the empirical results.
3.3. Geographical mobility and social capital
The ex-ante probability of moving is denoted by Pm and de-
pends on the distribution of wage offers in each region. Note that
for the sake of simplicity draws in F and G are not correlated.
Appendix A. shows that
Pm ¼
Z w
wr
Fðz dkSÞgðzÞdz: ð5Þ
For a worker to be mobile, there must be a wage offer in Region B
above her reservation wage wr* (hence the integral between wr*
and the upper support of wage offers) and a local wage offer that
is sufﬁciently low compared with the current offer z net of depreci-
ated social capital if the worker moves, hence the term F(z  dkS)
representing the fraction of such low local offers.
It thus becomes useful to examine how this probability varies
with S. To do so we obtain:
dPm
dS
¼ ðdp  dkÞFðwrÞgðwrÞ  dk
Z w
wr
f ðz dkSÞgðzÞdz: ð6Þ
The second term is easy to interpret: it is always negative, a higher S
means a higher loss of social capital in the event of geographical
mobility and thus reduces the number of acceptable offers in Region
B, except in the extreme case dk = 0 where social capital has no local
dimension. The ﬁrst term can be interpreted more subtly. To under-14 Note here that the decisions to accept and to move are simultaneous. These
intuitions, albeit correct, must be studied in the more a complex setup where all
offers take place simultaneously.
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wr in Region A and a marginal offerw*r in Region B. She is indifferent
to the two options (moving or remaining unemployed). We know
the amount dp of social capital she loses in rejecting both offers,
and the amount dk of social capital if she accepts the offer in Region
B. So, giving her one more unit of social capital makes her more
likely at the margin to remaining in Region A if the loss dk is greater
than the loss dp, e.g., dp  dk < 0.
Proposition 1. Effect of social capital on the mobility rate.
(i) A sufﬁcient condition for mobility to decline with S is that
dk > dp, i.e., in the case of relatively local social capital;
(ii) when dk > dp, w*r increases to w (possibly equal to +1) as
S? +1 and thus the mobility rate approaches zero;
(iii) a sufﬁcient condition for mobility to increase with S is that
dk = 0 and dp > 0 (non-local but professional social capital).
For the ﬁrst part of the proposition, the intuition is as follows:
dk > dp characterizes a type of social capital such as friendship or
neighborhood relations: social capital depreciates more when the
worker moves than when unemployed. In this case, as social capi-
tal increases, incentives to move disappear and hence mobility de-
clines. The second part of the proposition provides a result on the
limit of the mobility rate as social capital approaches inﬁnity. The
last part of the proposition corresponds to the reverse case: when
social capital is not local at all but is to some extent a professional
one, then a higher level of social capital increases the incentive to
move as workers prefer a job outside rather than no job inside the
region. Overall, this proposition illustrates that the nature of social
capital (localness or professionalness) is crucial when analyzing its
effect on mobility.
3.4. Employment, unemployment and social capital
The model also suggests various other relations between
employment status and social capital. More particularly it consid-
ers the probability of being unemployed, as given by:
Pu ¼ FðwrÞGðwrÞ: ð7Þ
The interpretation of (7) is easy: workers are unemployed if they re-
ceive two offers below their reservation wage. The impact of social
capital is thus straightforward: we obtain (see also Appendix A)
dPu
dS
¼ dpf ðwrÞGðwrÞ þ FðwrÞgðwrÞðdk  dpÞ; ð8Þ
which leads straightforward to:
Proposition 2. Effect of S on unemployment.
(i) A sufﬁcient condition for social capital to raise unemployment is
dp = 0;
(ii) another condition is that G is small and F is large at values w*r
and wr and that social capital is local dk > dp;
(iii) when dp > 0, wr? 0 when S? +1 and thus unemployment
rate approaches zero;
(iv) a sufﬁcient condition for social capital to reduce unemployment
instead is dp > dk, i.e., when social capital is relatively profes-
sional (as opposed to relatively local);
(v) in the general case, the effect is ambiguous.
As arguedabove, theﬁrst part states that social capitalmoderates
wage claims if it depreciates upon unemployment.When dp = 0, the
only impact of social capital is that it reduces mobility due to local-
ness. When G is large and F is small at the values w*r and wr, this
means that there are few good offers in Region B andmany good of-fers in Region A: in this case, the effect of localness dominates the ef-
fect of professional social capital depreciation. Theother parts of this
proposition are derived through applying the same logic.
Finally, the probability of ﬁnding a job in the local region is
Pw ¼
Z w
wr
Gðzþ dkSÞf ðzÞdz: ð9Þ
The interpretation is similar to that of the probability of moving: for a
worker to ﬁnd a local job, the wagemust be greater than the local res-
ervation wage (hence the integral between wr and the upper support
for the distribution of wages) and the wage offers in Region Bmust be
low compared to the local wage offer given the local social capital
depreciation in the event of amove to B (hence the termG(z + dkS) rep-
resents the fraction of such low offers). In addition, we have:
Proposition 3. Local employment probability is always increased by
social capital except if dk = dp = 0, in which case the probability is
unaffected by S.
Indeed,
dPw
dS
¼ dpGðwrÞf ðwrÞ þ dk
Z w
wr
gðwþ dkSÞf ðwÞdw:
As before, the interpretation is easy: the ﬁrst term represents the ef-
fect of one additional unit of social capital for a worker receiving an
offer wr, and with an offer w* below w*r. She accepts the local offer
even more so, since her social capital becomes depreciated. The sec-
ond term is zero if dk = 0 and positive; otherwise it reﬂects the sup-
plementary gain obtained by accepting a local offer when being
away in Region B depreciates her social capital. When dp = dk = 0,
S is just a scaling-up utility, but this does not affect the worker’s
arbitration between the different options.
4. Endogenous social capital
We now make S endogenous and explore its determinants. Gi-
ven the assumption that jobs last one period, the decision to invest
in social capital in the ﬁrst period is independent of activity status
(employed, unemployed) in the ﬁrst period. We can thus describe
the decisions in two steps. In the second period, the worker takes S
as predetermined and, after collecting offers decide whether to ac-
cept local or foreign offers. In the ﬁrst period, she anticipates their
decisions in the second and decides accordingly how much to in-
vest in social capital.
In the ﬁrst period, the worker maximizes U1 deﬁned ex-ante as
a ﬁrst period utility, which is given by:
U1 ¼ max
S
X1  CðSÞ þ bEU2ðSÞf g; ð10Þ
where b is a discount factor and the cost of investing in social cap-
ital S is C(S) with C0(S) > 0, C00(S) > 0. The key issue is thus to deter-
mine the quantity
EU2 ¼
Z w
0
Z w
0
 max bþ 1 dpS;wþ S;w þ ð1 dkÞSf gdFðwÞdGðwÞ:
ð11Þ
This is a relatively complex derivation but it can be simpliﬁed after
integrating by parts. The Online Appendix A.2 in fact shows that the
expected utility of agents given optimal choices is expressed by the
following lemma:
Lemma 1. Property of EU2
EU2 ¼ wþ S
Z w
wr
Gðzþ dkSÞFðzÞdz: ð12Þ
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pected utility is threefold. There is a positive direct effect on utility
through the linear term wþ S. There is a second effect expressed as
G(z + dkS) under the integral: more capital can be lost upon mobil-
ity. Lastly there is a negative effect expressed through the integral’s
boundaries (recall thatwr is decreasing in Swhenever dp > 0). Since
we will show that these two last effects arise from the fact that so-
cial capital reduces mobility and job acceptance, then we can link
the marginal effect of S to the various probabilities calculated
above. This is done in the next subsection.4.1. Choice of S
First we make the assumption that social capital is relatively lo-
cal, i.e., it depreciates more following a regional move than after a
job loss. From now on this will be considered the benchmark case.
In equations:
Assumption 1. Relatively local social capital: dk > dp > 0.
This yields some useful properties of dEU2dS .
Lemma 2. Properties of dEU2/dS.
(i) dEU2 ¼ 1 dpPu  dkPm > 0;15 See App
when both f
contract the
condition), i
positive anddS(ii) under Assumption 1, we obtain dEU2/dS? 1 when
S? +1;
(iii) d2EU2/dS
2 is strictly positive so that dEU2 /dS strictly
increases, except when either dp = dk = 0 or f = g = 0. In these
two cases, the second derivative is zero.
The key point is the ﬁrst one. The marginal effect that S has on
expected utility can conveniently be rewritten using (7) and (9):
the return to social capital is always strictly positive. A marginal in-
crease in S increases utility by 1, minus the probability of moving
(in which case a share dk is depreciated), minus the probability of
remaining unemployed locally (in which case a fraction dp of social
capital is depreciated). In the degenerate case dp = dk = 0, the mar-
ginal return to social capital is constant, equal to 1. The second
point results from calculating the limits of Pm and Pu for extreme
values of S established earlier in Propositions 1 and 2. See Online
Appendix A.3 for an illustration of the last point. The interpretation
is simple: except in degenerate cases, utility is convex in social
capital. Convexity arises when distributions are not degenerate be-
cause, by raising social capital, the individual can afford to reject
more offers and thus optimize its mobility/acceptance strategy
(in other words, she is better off because she has greater outside
options).15
Let bS be the social capital level satisfying the ﬁrst-order condi-
tion deﬁned by:
C 0ðbSÞ ¼ bð1 dpPu  dkPmÞ; ð13Þ
where Pu and Pm also depend on bS. Eq. (13) may be satisﬁed for
more than one value of bS. To illustrate this, we can draw the left-
hand side of Eq. (13), which is an increasing function of S and the
right-hand side which is convex. The two curves may intersect sev-
eral times, or not at all. We only know that for large values of S, the
right-hand side converges to 1, while, with a quadratic cost func-
tion, the left-hand side, the marginal cost, approaches inﬁnity, suchendix A.3 for the calculation of the quantity d3EU2/dS3. As a special case,
0 and g0 are uniformly negative on their support, a widely used property in
ory and known as the CRDC (concavity of the distribution function
t is possible to sign the four terms adding up to d3EU2/dS3 but three are
one is negative, so in general we cannot sign this quantity.that utility decreases after the last intersection, which is thus a
maximum for utility.
We represent utility in Fig. 1 in one of the ‘‘multiple intersec-
tions” cases. In such cases, there is usually a well-deﬁned global
maximum (either the ﬁrst or the second maximum), and the indi-
vidual optimally chooses one or the other. The point we want to
make is that a small difference between two individuals, due per-
haps to marginal differences in their cost functions, may lead to
very different observations of their behavior. In Fig. 1, the agent
would choose a low degree of local social capital and hence ex-ante
would be relatively mobile. Imagine now that the marginal cost of
investing is decreased by a tiny amount: then, the bimodal curve
changes, say in a counter-clockwise rotation (due to C(S) and is re-
duced relatively more for larger values of S), and thus the second
local maximum becomes a global maximum. This individual is thus
more likely to be immobile and invest a lot more in social capital.
Hence, there is a ﬁrst instance of complementarities between local
social capital and mobility.
Our model also displays an additional type of complementar-
ity: any exogenous decrease in expected mobility (e.g., an exog-
enous negative shift in the attractiveness of Region B) increases
the social capital level; this in turn reinforces the negative im-
pact on mobility. This can be seen from the ﬁrst-order condition
(13): the convexity of costs C with respect to S implies that the
investment in social capital will be larger when the right-hand
side of (13) is greater, i.e., when both risks of depreciation Pu
and Pm (i.e., unemployment and mobility) are lower and when
the rates of depreciation are lower (that is, dp and dk are lower).
Again, if dp = 0, the unemployment risk plays no role on the
choice of S, while the more dk approaches 0, the lower the im-
pact of Pm on the choice of S.
4.2. Extensions
4.2.1. Choice of the composition of S
A natural extension is to consider how the agent would choose
to invest in each type of social capital: local or professional or a
combination of both. Now we assume that the agent can trade
off the two types of social capital in choosing Sp and Sk separately,
where Sp does not depreciate if the individual moves to the other
region and remains employed, but fully depreciates if she is non-
employed, while Sk fully depreciates after a move to the other re-
gion but does not depreciate if the individual is non-employed in
the same region. We also assume that the second period utilities
are given by
U2 ¼
X2 þ Sp þ Sk if the worker is employed in Region A
X2 þ Sk if the worker is non-employed in Region A
X2 þ Sp if the worker is employed in Region B
X2 if the worker is non-employed in Region B
8>>><
>>:
:
In other words, instead of choosing the total social capital level
whose depreciation rates are exogenous, the worker can choose
her desired amount of professional (Sp) and local (Sk) social capital.
We then rewrite the program of agents as:
max
Sp ;Sk
X1  CðSp; SkÞ þ bEU2ðSp; SkÞf g
Using a simple symmetric, quadratic cost function such as:
CðSk; SpÞ ¼ ðSkþSpÞ
2
2 leads to particularly simple solutions: an interior
and two corner solutions, the proof of which is shown in Online
Appendix A.4. This is summarized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. When agents can choose different types of social
capital they want to invest in, where types are deﬁned by different
depreciation rates (local and professional), we have:
Fig. 1. Net utility as a function of social capital: case of multiple extrema.
16 See David et al. (2008).
17 The list of countries is the following: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
and the United Kingdom.
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Sp = b(1  Pu) and Sk = 0,
 if Pm < Pu, we are at a corner solution:the agents chooses
Sk = b(1  Pm) and Sp = 0,
 at an interior solution, the agent chooses Si, i = p,k, such that
Pm = Pu.
In words: agents preferably choose local capital whenever they
expect a low mobility rate compared with the unemployment rate
(Pm < Pu); and the opposite would occur when they anticipate high
mobility compared with the unemployment rate (Pm > Pu): they chose
professional social capital.
There is therefore a complementarity between the choice of the
type of social capital and mobility decisions. Notice that, in this
proposition, the probabilities of moving and being unemployed
themselves depend on the stocks of professional and local social
capital: we need to check ex-post that the ranking of Pm and Pu
are consistent with their values given the corner solution for Si,
i = p, k.
4.2.2. Employment protection
In the European context an interesting extension would be the
effect of employment protection legislation. By increasing the ex-
pected duration of jobs, investment would be induced in all sorts
of speciﬁc capital, such as job-speciﬁc skills, sector-speciﬁc skills,
housing, and in our more speciﬁc case, local social capital. We thus
explore this mechanism here.
We assume that at the end of period 1, workers remain em-
ployed with probability s, which can then be thought of as an index
of employment protection. The previous analysis was thus simply
the case s = 0. There are two cases to consider however: unem-
ployed workers in period 1 are not affected, and make the same
optimal choice bS as that determined before in the ﬁrst order condi-
tion (13). Consider now an employee with wage w1 in the ﬁrst per-
iod. In the beginning of the second period, she may lose her job
with probability 1  s and then face the same choice as before:
draw a set of wage offers w, w* and then maximize the mobility/
job acceptance decisions:
U2ðSÞ ¼ max bþ ð1 dpÞS;wþ S;w þ ð1 dkÞSf g: ð14Þ
Alternatively, she may have the option of keeping her initial job
with wage w1, and face the following alternative with probability s:
U2ðSÞ ¼ max w1 þ S;wþ S;w þ ð1 dkÞSf g: ð15ÞIn other words, denoting the utility in case of a layoff by
U2(S,b,dp,dk), and in case of no-layoff as U2(S,w1,0,dk), (b is replaced
by w1 and dp by 0), the program in the ﬁrst period is now:
max
S
CðSÞ þ ð1 sÞU2ðS; b; dp; dkÞ þ sU2ðS;w1;0; dkÞ:
Based on the ﬁrst order condition on S derived in Online Appendix
A.5, we thus obtain the following implications.
Proposition 5. Employment protection increases the investment in
local social capital. Higher local wages (relative to wages in Region B)
also increase local social capital, since workers are more likely to stay
in Region A. Finally, the two effects interact complementarily: the
higher the marginal effect of employment protection on social capital,
the higher the local wages.
In a previous version of this work,16 we also explored the role of
aggregate externalities. In that version, we assumed that the cost of
investing in social capital was a decreasing function of the aggregate
stock of social capital. The idea was that it is easier to make friends in
a friendly environment. Allowing for aggregate externalities leads to
multiple aggregate equilibria: one equilibirum is characterized by
high mobility, low unemployment and low stock of social capital,
while the other equilibrium displays low mobility, high unemploy-
ment and high stock of social capital. This section remains available
in the Online Appendix.
5. Data
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Here we attempt to ﬁnd an empirical counterpart to the concept
of local social capital. We base our analysis on the European Com-
munity Household Panel Survey (ECHP), which is a survey based on
a standardized questionnaire that involves annual interviewing of
a representative panel of individuals in 15 European countries17 for
the 1994–2001 period. In our context, it is particularly useful be-
cause it surveys various dimensions of an individual’s social life
and social capital. For reasons argued in the literature review, we fo-
cus more on association membership and the frequency of social
Table 2
Summary statistics.
Variable Observations Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max
Friends/relatives 566,281 0.488 0.41 0 1
Neighbors 566,281 0.438 0.43 0 1
Club 500,053 0.374 0.48 0 1
Geographic mobility 441,024 0.007 0.08 0 1
Male 566,281 0.57 0.49 0 1
Female 566,281 0.43 0.49 0 1
Rent-free accommodation 560,878 0.034 0.18 0 1
Owner 560,878 0.716 0.45 0 1
Tenant with rent 560,878 0.251 0.43 0 1
Age category 16–25 566,281 0.154 0.36 0 1
Age category 26–35 566,281 0.284 0.45 0 1
Age category 36–45 566,281 0.260 0.44 0 1
Age category 46–55 566,281 0.210 0.41 0 1
Age category 56–65 566,281 0.930 0.29 0 1
Years of education 566,281 10.5 5.53 0 25
Employed 566,281 0.901 0.3 0 1
Unemployed 566,281 0.099 0.3 0 1
Living alone 566,281 0.089 0.29 0 1
Two members in
household
566,281 0.199 0.4 0 1
Three members in
household
566,281 0.223 0.42 0 1
Four members in
household
566,281 0.282 0.45 0 1
Five members in
household
566,281 0.207 0.41 0 1
Separated 552,771 0.014 0.12 0 1
Divorced 552,771 0.047 0.21 0 1
Widowed 552,771 0.014 0.12 0 1
Never married 552,771 0.338 0.47 0 1
Notes: The summary statistics are calculated from the ECHP data over the period
1994–2001. Fourteen EU countries are considered: Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxembourg, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Ger-
many, and UK. The sample is restricted to the active population.
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presumably more closely associated with the concept of localness,
which we have in mind (a soccer club is local, but chess or Scrabble
associations usually involve country-wide ties).18
More precisely, the social capital measures are derived from the
three following questions in the ECHP survey:
1. Variable ‘‘Club”: Are you a member of any club, such as a sport
or entertainment club, a local or neighborhood group, a party,
etc.?
2. Variable ‘‘Neighbors”: How often do you talk to any of your
neighbors?
3. Variable ‘‘Friends/relatives”: How often do you meet friends or
relatives not living with you, whether here at home or
elsewhere?
Questions 2 and 3 correspond precisely to a social capital type
that is clearly local. The ‘‘Friends/relatives” question may refer in
part to professional social capital (that is, capital that depreciates
when the individual is unemployed). The ‘‘Club” question may re-
fer to less local social capital. Even though phrased to suggest non-
professional social capital, it may be professional if associations are
professional ones, although we have no direct evidence in one
sense or the other.
The answer to the ﬁrst question is yes/no and is attributed the
value 1 or 0. The answer to the last two questions deﬁnes a fre-
quency for a discrete support value, set as follows: (1) on most
days; (2) once or twice a week; (3) once or twice a month; (4) less
often than once a month; (5) never. In order to simplify the results
presented, we built the following index measure:
Zi;t ¼ I½Xi;t ¼ 1 þ I½Xi;t ¼ 2:27þ I½Xi;t ¼ 3:
2
30
þ I½Xi;t ¼ 4: 160
þ I½Xi;t ¼ 5:0;
where Zi,t is the index value for individual i at time t and Xi,t the an-
swer to the question. I[] is an indicator function that takes value 1 if
the expression in brackets is true and 0 if it is not.19
The top part of Table 2 summarizes the relevant statistics. The
means of the social capital variables are 0.49 and 0.44, respectively,
and the standard deviations approximately 0.4. Club membership
is 37.4%. Our sample is restricted to the economically active popu-
lation and will have 90% employed and 10% unemployed over the
period. Other demographic statistics are summarized in the bot-
tom part of Table 2. Note that we also estimated an employment
equation (instead of unemployment) for the larger sample of 26–
55 year old individuals—thus including non-participants—but
found no qualitative difference. As a result we displayed only the
mobility and the unemployment results.
5.2. Empirical strategy
The mechanisms we want to highlight can be uncovered
through estimating the following equations:18 There is also a general argument against the use of trust; as surveyed in Glaeser
et al. (2002) and Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005), along with Putnam (2000), due to
misreporting. Club membership is veriﬁable and since it is costly, a logic of revealed
preferences can apply. In contrast, during a survey interview, individuals talk about
conﬁdence and trust is cheap. Further, due to language differences in European
countries, responses may be subject to translation bias.
19 We tried a few other speciﬁcations, one including the log of this variable (but we
needed to arbitrarily replace the zero with, either 1/365 or half of this number), which
improved the signiﬁcance of coefﬁcients at the cost of introducing a certain
arbitrariness. To detect non-monotonicity we also tried assigning dummy variables
to the ﬁve possible answers. For the impact of social capital on mobility, we did not
ﬁnd any non-monotonicity and thus decided to retain a simple, linear speciﬁcation
throughout.Pi;tþ1m ¼ Uðpmxi;t þ bmfriendsrelativesfreqi;t þ cmneibfreqi;t
þ /mclubi;t þ i;tþ1m Þ;Pi;tþ1u ¼ Uðpuxi;t þ bufriendsrelativesfreqi;t þ cuneibfreqi;t
þ /uclubi;t þ i;tþ1u Þ;
where U is the normal distribution, Pi;tþ1m and P
i;tþ1
u are, respectively,
the probabilities of moving to another area and of being unem-
ployed for individual i in period t + 1, the time period being a year.
xi,t is a vector of exogenous controls, namely sex (1 if female, 0 if
male), house tenure (categorical variable stating whether the indi-
vidual is owner of his house, whether she rents it or has it for free),
age category (16–25, 26–35, 36–45, 46–55 and 56+), number of
years of education, a dummy variable for unemployment, house-
hold size (1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 and more persons), marital status (married,
separated, divorced, widowed or never married) and time effects
and i;tþ1m and 
i;tþ1
u are individual shocks; as a robustness check,
we will also include a ﬁxed effect in those shocks. Finally, the vari-
ables friendsrelativesfreqi,t and neibfreqi,t correspond to our measures
of local social capital, while clubi,t is club membership, as deﬁned
previously. We interpret ‘‘Club” as another measure of social capi-
tal, which is not necessarily local, but that may help understand
the role played by ‘‘Neighbors” and ‘‘Friends/relatives”. Hence, we
are interested in the sign and signiﬁcance of bm, cm, /m, bu, cu or
/u and the magnitude of their impact.
In a ﬁrst set of regressions, we will consider social capital mea-
sures as exogenous and run simple probit regressions. We intro-
duce the various measures of social capital separately or
together, because there could be some positive correlation across
Table 3
Summary of the results for inter-area mobility.
Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Friends/relatives 0.139 0.104 0.115 0.079
(5.06)** (3.54)** (3.94)** (2.51)*
Neighbors 0.149 0.125 0.159 0.141
(5.48)** (4.29)** (5.44)** (4.46)**
Club 0.063 0.059 0.059 0.055
(3.08)** (2.85)** (2.59)** (2.40)*
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Region Dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 403,568 403,568 385,403 385,403 357,122 357,122 339,086 339,086
IVprobit1 IVprobit1 IVprobit1 IVprobit1 IVprobit1 IVprobit1 IVprobit1 I Vprobit1
Friends/relatives 0.481 0.378 0.436 0.330
(5.64)** (3.65)** (4.85)** (3.00)**
Neighbors 0.136 0.001 0.132 0.013
(2.24)* (0.01) (1.97)* (0.15)
Club 0.034 0.010 0.016 0.008
(0.74) (0.21) (0.31) (0.16)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Region dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 323,246 323,246 299,625 299,625 286,579 286,579 262,824 262,824
IVprobit2 IVprobit2 IVprobit2 IVprobit2 Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect
Friends/relatives 0.043 0.370 0.048 0.106
(0.23) (1.88) (0.63) (1.23)
Neighbors 0.196 0.310 0.291 0.345
(2.17)* (2.74)** (3.57)** (3.84)**
Club 0.447 0.629 0.082 0.077
(0.95) (1.35) (1.12) (1.05)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Region dummies No No No No No No No No
Observations 403,568 403,568 385,403 385,403 12,013 12,013 9717 9717
Notes: As additional explanatory variables, the above regressions include sex, house tenure, age categories, years of education, a dummy for unemployment, household size,
marital status. For the ﬁrst set of IV estimations (IVprobit1), social capital is instrumented by its lag. For the second set of IV estimations (IVprobit2), social capital is
instrumented by the regional average of social capital. ‘‘Fixed effect” refers to logit ﬁxed-effect speciﬁcations. See the Technical Appendix available on the webpage for more
detailed results. Robust z statistics in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 5%.
** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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whether the inclusion of 92 regional effects affects the results.
Next, we apply instrumental variable techniques to control for
potential endogeneity. We try several instruments, generally yield-
ing the same kind of results. A ﬁrst instrument is individual social
capital lag. It is a strong instrument and highly correlated with
contemporaneous social capital, but can be criticized for not
removing all endogeneity. A second type of instrument is the aver-
age social capital in the region. It is more likely to be exogenous,
but could be weaker, that is less correlated with an individual’s
contemporaneous social capital. We will report IV estimates with
both types of IV estimations, as well as ﬁxed effect regressions as
a ﬁnal robustness check. A discussion of a further set of alternative
instruments is provided in Appendix B.20
5.3. Mobility, unemployment and social capital
5.3.1. Mobility
Table 3 summarizes the mobility regressions using all speciﬁca-
tions discussed above, while the other coefﬁcients are shown in20 Technically, in all IV regressions, we follow a two-stage procedure: we ﬁrst
regress the social capital measures on the instruments, and use the projection as
regressors in probit regressions. The IV regressions we present therefore have biased
standard errors. We are thus left with two alternatives; either we choose to correct
for the bias in s.e. due to IV or correct for the bias due to individual clustering due to
the panel dimension. Here we choose to correct for clustering, mostly because the
correction procedure implementation proposed by Wooldridge (2002) for IV correc-
tion would actually lead the s.e. being lower than with the uncorrected s.e. as shown
in the IV tables. The s.e. displayed here thus form an upper bound for the ‘‘true” s.e.Online Appendix (Tables A-1 to A-4). Generally speaking, all three
variables used to measure social capital have negative and signiﬁ-
cant effects on mobility. In IV regressions, the number of observa-
tions is also reduced by approximately 25% for each of the
instruments: either because of lags or because the region of resi-
dence is sometimes missing. The estimates have thus lost some
efﬁciency, but generally speaking the coefﬁcients remain negative
and usually signiﬁcant. In particular, the ‘‘Neighbors” variable has a
signiﬁcant and negative impact on mobility, while the ‘‘Club” var-
iable is typically no longer signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcients of other
variables, mainly demographic ones, are reported in Online Appen-
dix (Tables A-2 and A-3). They make sense: women are less mobile,
as are house owners, older people, large families and married indi-
viduals. The unemployed are not signiﬁcantly more mobile, but the
educated are clearly much more so.
Finally, Table 3 also displays individual ﬁxed effect regressions
for the mobility equation (bottom right), as robustness check. Not
surprisingly given that the variation is now within, the social cap-
ital coefﬁcients turn out to be much less signiﬁcant as compared
with the regressions without individual ﬁxed effects. Even though,
the ‘‘Neighbors” variable remains signiﬁcant: even the—necessarily
moderate—time variations in ‘‘Neighbors” social capital for a given
individual generates a decline in mobility.5.3.2. Unemployment
Table 4 provides individual unemployment regressions, showing
that the results are relatively stable across speciﬁcations, but that
interesting changes in sign and signiﬁcance take place across the
Table 4
Summary of the results for individual unemployment.
Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Friends/relatives 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003
(0.39) (0.38) (0.27) (0.18)
Neighbors 0.052 0.061 0.045 0.058
(4.04)** (4.53)** (3.23)** (3.90)**
Club 0.131 0.133 0.135 0.137
(11.74)** (11.87)** (10.57)** (10.67)**
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Region dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 413,599 413,599 381,493 381,493 360,291 360,291 328,309 328,309
IVprobit1 IVprobit1 IVprobit1 IVprobit1 IVprobit1 IVprobit1 IVprobit1 I Vprobit1
Friends/relatives 0.112 0.096 0.088 0.071
(2.74)** (2.00)* (1.95) (1.34)
Neighbors 0.163 0.165 0.149 0.163
(5.40)** (4.59)** (4.35)** (4.03)**
Club 0.259 0.271 0.245 0.257
(10.89)** (11.24)** (9.19)** (9.49)**
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Region dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 330,051 330,051 295,933 295,933 289,239 289,239 255,280 255,280
IVprobit2 IVprobit2 IVprobit2 IVprobit2 Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect
Friends/relatives 0.312 0.287 0.009 0.000
(3.75)** (3.20)** (0.28) (0.00)
Neighbors 0.227 0.182 0.035 0.043
(3.83)** (2.32)* (1.04) (1.21)
Club 1.787 1.648 0.061 0.061
(11.14)** (10.61)** (1.99)* (1.96)*
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Region dummies No No No No No No No No
Observations 413,599 413,599 381,493 381,493 58,364 58,364 54,266 54,266
Notes: As additional explanatory variables, the above regressions include sex, house tenure, age categories, years of education, a dummy for unemployment, household size,
marital status. For the ﬁrst set of IV estimations (IVprobit1), social capital is instrumented by its lag. For the second set of IV estimations (IVprobit2), social capital is
instrumented by the regional average of social capital. ‘‘Fixed effect” refers to logit ﬁxed-effect speciﬁcations. See the Technical Appendix available on the webpage for more
detailed results. Robust z statistics in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 5%.
** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
200 Q. David et al. / Journal of Urban Economics 68 (2010) 191–204social capitalmeasures. Themainﬁndings are that ‘‘Neighbors” has a
positive impact on the unemployment probability, while ‘‘Club” has
anegative impact,with orwithout the regional effects. The ‘‘Friends/
relatives” variable is generally not signiﬁcant ormarginally positive,
except in the last set of IV regressions when instruments are social
capital at the regional level.21 OnlineAppendix (Tables A-5 toA-8) list
the other coefﬁcients. Again, we replicated the same speciﬁcation
using ﬁxed effects as a robustness check.5.3.3. Validity of the instruments and further checks
The Online Appendix (Tables A-13 to A-16) shows the tests for
the validity of the instruments. More speciﬁcally, we deﬁne a vari-
able lit calculated as the difference between the mobility variable
(or alternatively the unemployment variable) and the prediction of
an IV regression.We then regress this variableliton the instruments
and all other exogenous variables. Based on F-tests that show the
insigniﬁcance of the exogenous variables in the latter regression,21 The lack of signiﬁcance for ‘‘Friends/relatives” can also be explained by a light
non-monotonicity of its effect on unemployment. Indeed, individuals having a very
low or very high frequency of visits to friends are those with the highest
unemployment rates, while individuals with an intermediate frequency have lower
rates. In the next section, to make some sense of the non-monotonicity, we would
need to introduce additional ingredients in the theory exposed, particularly the
search and network effects described by Granovetter (1995). See for example the
series of papers written by Calvó-Armengol (2004), Calvó-Armengol and Jackson
(2004) or Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2005). In our paper, we will not explore this
interesting issue any further, but rather leave it for future research.we can conclude to exogeneity.22 We ﬁnally tried several speciﬁca-
tions with both individual ﬁxed effect and IVs, but there is deﬁnitely
too little within variance in instruments to get any effects: we reach
the limits of the database. Not that the effects we attempt to identify
are not there, but the time series dimensions of ECHP are too small.5.3.4. Summary
The magnitude of the effects of the benchmark regressions23
is displayed in Table 5, resulting from calculations on the condi-
tional mobility rate and the conditional unemployment rate for
two groups of individuals in the sample (say, an Italian male,
owner, 36–45 years old, etc. and a Dutch woman, tenant paying
rent, 26–35 years old, etc.). In the absence of social capital (all so-
cial capital variables were set to zero), the mobility rates are 0.10%
and 4.99%, while unemployment rates are 5.45% and 7.06%,
respectively. Next we consider the impact of the maximum
amount of social capital (1 for ‘‘Club” and the highest possible fre-
quency of visits of friends and neighbors). The variable ‘‘Friends/
relatives” has the largest impact on mobility, reducing the mobil-
ity rate to almost zero for the Italian male and by two-thirds for
the Dutch woman. The impact of social capital on unemployment
is more ambiguous. For ‘‘Club” the unemployment risk is reduced22 We also ran the same tests with linear IV regressions (instead of probit). We also
ﬁnd the exogeneity of the instruments.
23 The summary of the results with alternative regressions such as IVs, non-IVs or
ﬁxed effects are not reported but available from authors on request.
Table 5
Probabilities of moving and being unemployed: examples.
Probability of ? Moving (%) Unemployment (%)
Italian man, owner, 36–45 years old, married, living with someone, year 2000 No social capital 0.10 5.45
If friends and relatives, every day 0.07 +0.73
If neighbors, every day 0.00 +1.30
if club 0.00 1.69
Fraction of mobility reduced by the maximum combination of social capital 75
Fraction of unemployment added by the maximum combination of friends and neighbors +40
Dutch woman, tenant with rent, 26–35 years old, never married, living alone, year 1996 No social capital 4.99 7.06
If friends and relatives, every day 2.84 +1.02
If neighbors, every day 0.00 +1.84
If club 0.10 2.28
Fraction of mobility reduced by the maximum combination of social capital 58
Fraction of unemployment added by the maximum combination of friends and neighbors +44
Note: The above probabilities are computed from the ﬁtted values of the instrumental variable probit regression (IVprobit1) from Tables 3 and 4 with country dummies and
all social capital measures introduced as regressors.
Fig. 2. Impact of seniority in the region on social capital.
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crease by approximately one-third.
5.4. Social capital and regional migration
The results from the preceding section suggest that the stock of
local social capital reduces mobility. According to the theory, ex-
pected mobility should be associated with less social capital.
To examine this reverse causality, i.e., the fact that individuals
forecast future mobility episodes and endogenously determine
their level of social capital, we explore how social capital might de-
pend on long-run mobility. In David et al. (2008b), we tested
whether social capital depends on previous episode of mobility.
We showed that, if the individual was not born in the country of
current residence, or if he has not lived in the same region since
birth, it leads to a huge discount in social capital. We have extended
here this speciﬁcation and have regressed our measures of local so-
cial capital on the number of years since arrival in that region,
which is now predetermined.24 It appears that our three measures
of social capital increase with the number of years since arrival in24 These results are available in the Online Appendix (Table A-9).the region. Fig. 2 shows these relationships between the amount of
social capital accumulated and the time elapsed since the arrival of
individuals in the region,25 again showing that a reverse causal link
exists between social capital and migrations.6. Conclusion
In this paper, we discuss the fact that low mobility is the out-
come of self-reinforcing factors: investments in local social capital
are induced by low mobility and in turn they become a factor of
immobility. We exhibit several examples of complementarity be-
tween high local social capital and low mobility rate. Data analysis
supports the theory. Local social capital has unambiguous negative
effects on individual geographical mobility, while it increases indi-
vidual unemployment probabilities. The magnitude of the effects is
quite striking.
The implications of this paper on the unemployment debate can
be summarized as follows. Unemployment in Europe is usuallyFor this ﬁgure, we group the number of years since arrival in the region by ﬁve
years (0–4, 5–9, 10–14, etc.) and use a dummy for each group. This procedure allows
to capture a non-linear effect of the past mobility on the investment in social capital.
202 Q. David et al. / Journal of Urban Economics 68 (2010) 191–204thought to be the result of various market imperfections (unem-
ployment compensation, employment protection, good market
imperfections; wage compression), with all variables negatively
affecting mobility as well.26 Our paper shows that in the literature
mentioned above, the factors causing unemployment are the same
as those leading to accumulation of local social capital.
Our theory indicates that local social capital is complementary to
other explanations of high European unemployment and this has
consequences regarding its persistence. Local social capital may
indeed act as a bottleneck, preventing mobility. Attempts to handle
unemployment by changing labor market institutions may fail
given vicious circle involving immobility and high local social capi-
tal. Deregulating labor markets may simply increase inequality, but
will not necessarily increase mobility a great deal. An efﬁcient re-
form of the labor markets should instead combine traditional re-
forms and develop incentives to increase mobility, through social
channels: the example of the Rotary Club given in introduction is
an interesting policy that local authorities could use to attract
migrants from other regions.
In conclusion, we would like to suggest that differences in
unemployment across European countries are related to intra-
European differences in attitudes towards social capital. David
et al. (2008b) report country-level regressions inspired by Layard
and Nickell (1999). More particularly, they show that at the country
level the log of unemployment is strongly and positively linked to
social capital. We leave this for future work and simply conclude
that social capital is an interesting avenue to explore.27Acknowledgments
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cial support.Appendix A. Theory appendix: decisions of the agent at a given S
and determination of Pm, Pu, Pw
This Appendix summarizes the proofs. Complete proofs are
available in Online Appendix A.1.
Decision tree
There are three main possible cases for an agent, in order:
remaining non-employed, accepting a local offer, and ﬁnally
accepting an offer in Region B: we have thus26 Generous unemployment compensation increases the relative return of staying in
a local depressed area. Strong employment protection increases incentives to invest
in local skills as job duration is anticipated to be much higher, thus reducing mobility;
it increases the incentives to invest in job-speciﬁc skills and thus reduces job-to-job
mobility; a decent amount of market imperfections and particularly obstacles to job
creations in booming regions/sectors reduce the return from mobility in depressed
regions; and wage compression reduces the returns from moving to booming regions.
See Hassler et al. (2000, 2005), Ljunqvist and Sargent (1998, 2002), Bertola and Ichino
(1995), Wasmer (2006) and Bertola and Rogerson (1997) for more on these
alternative or complementary explanations.
27 As many recent works have shown, Algan and Cahuc (2007), Calvó-Armengol and
Jackson (2006), Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2005), Cahuc and Fontaine (2009).U2 ¼ bþ ð1 dpÞS
if bþ ð1 dpÞS > wþ S > w þ ð1 dkÞS or bþ ð1 dpÞS > w
þ ð1 dkÞS > wþ S
U2 ¼ wþ S
if wþ S > bþ ð1 dpÞS > w þ ð1 dkÞS or wþ S > w
þ ð1 dkÞS > bþ ð1 dpÞS
U2 ¼ w þ ð1 dkÞS
if w þ ð1 dkÞS > wþ S > bþ ð1 dpÞS or w þ ð1 dkÞS > b
þ ð1 dpÞS > wþ S:
Determination of Pm
The probability of moving is formally
Pm ¼ P w þ ð1 dkÞS > wþ Sf g \ w þ ð1 dkÞS > bþ ð1 dpÞSf g½ ;
ðA1Þ
and can be shown to be equal to
Pm ¼
Z w
wr
Fðz dkSÞgðzÞdz:
which gives Eq. (5).
Determination of Pu
Pu writes formally as
Pu ¼ P bþ ð1 dpÞS > wþ Sf g \ bþ ð1 dpÞS > w þ ð1 dkÞSf g½ :
ðA2Þ
and can be shown to yield
Pu ¼
Z w
0
I½wr > wGðwrÞdFðwÞ ¼ FðwrÞGðwrÞ:
Deriving, we have:
dPu
dS
¼ f ðwrÞGðwrÞ @w
r
@S
þ FðwrÞgðwrÞ @w
r
@S
;
which leads to Eq. (8) and thus to Proposition 2.
Determination of Pw
The local employment probability is formally
Pw ¼ P wþ S > bþ ð1 dpÞSf g \ wþ S > w þ ð1 dkÞSf g½ ; ðA3Þ
and can be shown to be equal to
Pw ¼
Z w
0
I½w > wrGðwþ dkSÞdFðwÞ;
which gives Eq. (9).
Appendix B. Data appendix
B.1. Variables description
 Mobility: variable taking value 1 if the household has been in
the current dwelling for less than 12 months.
 House tenure: in the survey, this variable refers to the following
question: Does your household own this dwelling or do you
rent it? The possible answers are (1) owner, (2) tenant/subten-
ant, paying rent (including when rent recovered from housing
beneﬁt) and (3) accommodation is provided rent-free.
Q. David et al. / Journal of Urban Economics 68 (2010) 191–204 203 Age category: we grouped individuals into four categories:
16–24, 16–34, 35–54, and 55–64.
 Education: in the survey, this variable refers to the following
question: Age when the Highest Level of General or Higher
Education was Completed. The possible answers are numbers
between 9 and 75. To correct for potential bias we followed
the procedure proposed in Wasmer et al. (forthcoming).
 Household size: in the survey, this variable refers to the follow-
ing question: Household Size (Total Number of Household
Members at Present). The possible answers are numbers
between 1 and 96. We grouped the answers into ﬁve categories:
1, 2, 3, 4 and 5+.
 Marital status: in the survey, this variable refers to the following
question: Present Marital Status. The possible answers are (1)
Married, (2) Separated, (3) Divorced, (4) Widowed, (5) Never
married.
 Regional dummies: in the survey, this variable refers to the fol-
lowing question: Region in which the Household is Presently
Situated. The classiﬁcation followed for this question is the
NUTS2 AGGREGATES from the European Commission, which
considers comparable regions with a population comprised
between 800 000 and 3 millions inhabitants. For more informa-
tion, please refer to the following web site: http://ec.europa.eu/
comm/eurostat/ramon/nuts. Note also that some countries like
the Netherlands have not ﬁlled this question.
B.2. Description of the instruments
As explained in the text, we tried several instruments. The two
most convincing instruments are:
(a) the average level of social capital in the region where the
individual lives: it is clearly exogenous to the individuals
and fairly correlated to individual’s social capital. We have
however made several other attempts.
(b) lags of individuals’ social capital.
Additional instruments relate to the regional vote and turnout
in elections. In particular, we considered regional turnout at parlia-
mentary elections. The intuition is that higher turnout is the sign of
higher social cohesion, hence more social capital. Exogeneity in the
unemployment/mobility equation is insured by the fact that we
choose lagged turnout, that is, the last election before year 1990
in each available country. The data are missing for Austria, Greece
and France. Unfortunately, correlation with our measures of social
capital was poor, resulting in important loss of efﬁciency.
A second set of additional instruments can be found in the
anthropological analysis of family structures. Todd (1990), a well
known demographer and anthropologist, has argued that such
structures are extremely stable over the pace of centuries, and
can be categorized in four or ﬁve groups, based on the balance of
authority (nuclear vs. ‘‘souche”, that is, patriarcal) and of the type
transmission of land and wealth (equalitarian, each offspring get-
ting an equal share, or inequalitarian, the elder getting the largest
share). Combining these two criteria leads, according to Todd, to a
map of regions in Europe where in each region, one type of the four
possible family structure is dominant, with sometimes several
types coexisting. Spilimbergo and Ubeda (2004b) used similar
instruments for their US study. In attributing a number for each
category of structure, we build an instrument for social capital
which is used in individual regressions. It appears to be very corre-
lated with our measures of social capital. With this set of instru-
ments, the results are robust for the mobility equation. However,
for the unemployment equation results were not consistent across
speciﬁcations.Appendix C. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.jue.2010.04.003.References
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